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Abstract
The Indonesian constitutional system contains a serious flaw that means 
that the constitutionality of a large number of laws cannot be determined 
by any court. Although the jurisdiction for the judicial review of laws is split 
between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, neither can review 
the constitutionality of subordinate regulations. This is problematic because 
in Indonesia the real substance of statutes is often found in implementing 
regulations, of which there are very many. This paper argues that that is open 
to the Constitutional Court to reconsider its position on review of regulations 
in order to remedy this problem. It could do so by interpreting its power of 
judicial review of statutes to extend to laws below the level of statutes. The 
paper begins with a brief account of how Indonesia came to have a system of 
judicial constitutional review that is restricted to statutes. It then examines the 
experience of South Korea’s Constitutional Court, a court in an Asian civil law 
country with a split jurisdiction for judicial review of laws like Indonesia’s. Despite 
controversy, this court has been able to interpret its powers to constitutionally 
invalidate statutes in such a way as to extend them to subordinate regulations 
as well. This paper argues that Indonesia’s Constitutional Court should follow 
South Korea’s example, in order to prevent the possibility of constitutionalism 
being subverted by unconstitutional subordinate regulations.
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So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and 
the Constitution apply in a particular case so that the Court must either 
decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, 
or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court 
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This 
is of the very essence of judicial duty.
United States Supreme Court, Marbury v. Madison, 5 US 137 (1803)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Indonesian constitutional system contains a serious flaw that means 
that the constitutionality of a very large number of laws cannot be determined 
by any court. This is because although jurisdiction for the judicial review of 
laws is split between the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) and the 
Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung), neither can review the constitutionality 
of subordinate regulations, that is, laws that rank below the level of statutes 
(undang-undang) produced by the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People’s 
Representative Assembly), the national legislature. 
1.1 The Constitutional Court’s Review Jurisdiction
Article 24C(1) of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution (as amended) grants the 
Constitutional Court the power to review the constitutionality of DPR statutes. 
In several decisions, the Court has held that its constitutional review powers 
extend to Perppu,1 that is, interim emergency laws produced by the president, on 
the grounds that these are equivalent in effect to statutes.2 The  Constitutional 
Court has, however, declined to review the constitutionality of ‘lower level’ laws 
used in Indonesia, that is, any law ranked below the level of statute in the 
formal hierarchy of Indonesian laws as specified by Article 7 of Law 12 of 2011 
on Lawmaking.3 This applies even to subordinate regulations made pursuant 
1 Perppu, Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang, Regulation in Lieu of Law. These are interim emergency 
statutes issued by the president. They must be confirmed as statutes or rejected by the DPR at its next sitting. 
They are ranked at the same level as statutes in the hierarchy of Indonesian laws described in footnote 3.
2 Cases where the Indonesian Constitutional Court has reviewed Perppu include Decisions 3/PUU-III/2005; 138/ 
PUU-VII/2009; and 1-2/PUU-XII/2014.
3 The hierarchy is as follows: (a) the 1945 Constitution (Undang-undang Dasar 1945); (b) MPR Decision (Ketetapan 
MPR); (c) Statutes/interim emergency laws (Undang-Undang/Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang, 
also known as Government Regulations in Lieu of Laws); (d) Government Regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah); (d) 
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to a statute or in order to enforce a statute. The Court has, in fact, rejected 
applications in which it has been asked to engage in constitutional review of 
implementing regulations.
1.2 The Supreme Court’s Review Jurisdiction
Article 24A(1) of the Constitution grants the Supreme Court power to 
review laws below the level of statutes produced by the DPR, to ensure that 
they comply with higher level laws.4 It can invalidate a legal instrument below 
the level of statute if it conflicts with a higher legislative instrument; or if the 
process by which it was enacted did not conform to legislative requirements.5 
Unfortunately, it is well-established that these powers do not extend to allow 
the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of lower level laws. This is 
because constitutional review is the exclusive remit of the Constitutional Court, 
which enjoys ‘first and final’ jurisdiction in this regard, under Article 24C(1) of 
the Constitution. In fact, the Supreme Court has not had any power to conduct 
constitutional review of laws since 1950, and even then, the power was highly 
restricted, as is explained later in this paper.
The Supreme Court’s already limited jurisdiction for review of regulations is, 
in practice, further restricted by its apparent lack of enthusiasm for reviewing 
them against higher-level laws. It usually takes a very formalistic approach, 
focused on the process by which a regulation was made. In its judgments in 
many such cases, the court does not discuss the substance of the law under 
review, the arguments of the parties, or even whether the law contradicts any 
higher laws.6 In other words, the Court has been reluctant to openly consider 
the ‘merits’ of the case. In fact, it sometimes seems to seeking reasons to avoid 
dealing with the merits.7 
Presidential Regulations (Peraturan Presiden); (e) Provincial Regional Regulations (Peraturan Daerah Propinsi); and 
(f) Regency/City Regional Regulations (Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten/Kota). None of these categories of law may 
conflict with any law higher in the hierarchy. For example, the substance of a presidential regulation must not 
conflict with the substance of a government regulation. Likewise, a higher-level regulation can amend or overrule 
a law lower than itself in the hierarchy – for example, the DPR can pass legislation to override a presidential 
regulation. 
4 See also Law 4 of 2004 on the Judiciary (Article 11(2)(b)); and Law 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court (Article 31(1)).
5 Article 31(2) of Law 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court.
6 See, for example, Indonesian Supreme Court Decisions Nos 03 G/HUM/2002, 06 P/HUM/2003 and 06 P/HUM/2006.
7 See generally, Chapter Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, Indonesian Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press (in press, 
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1.3 The Gap in Indonesia’s Review System
The result of this situation is a gap in Indonesia’s system for the judicial review 
of laws, with no judicial mechanism available to deal with the constitutional 
review of laws below the level of statute, of which there are very many.8 There 
is therefore no way an Indonesian affected by the unconstitutionality of a lower 
level law can obtain relief, unless the national legislature, the DPR can be 
persuaded to legislate to overrule the regulation. This would usually not be a 
realistic alternative to constitutional review because a DPR decision would be 
based on political reasons rather than legal ones, and, in any case, the DPR is 
notoriously very slow in working through its legislative agenda.9
The absence of a judicial mechanism for the constitutional review of laws 
below the level of statute matters a great deal in Indonesia because, as Damien 
and Hornick have explained, the real substance of any statute is often only to 
found in its implementing regulations:
[statutes] function more as policy declarations than as statutory schemes. 
Implementation usually depends on the enactment of subsequent legislation 
and the promulgation of special implementing regulations. Until such 
implementing rules are established, the ‘basic’ law operates mostly as a 
statement of national intention.10
This problem has become all the more serious since the Constitutional 
Court in two decisions in 201711 struck down provisions allowing the Ministry 
of Home Affairs to annul enacted Regional Regulations (Peraturan Daerah, 
Perda), finding that to do so usurped the power of the judicial branch. These 
decisions yet further restrict the avenues available for citizens to take action 
2018), Chapters 2 and 3.  For a discussion of some of these issues, see Simon Butt and Nicholas Parsons, "Judi-
cial Review and the Supreme Court in Indonesia: A New Space for Law?," Indonesia 98 (April 2014): 97. See also 
Simon Butt, "Regional Autonomy and the Proliferation of Perda in Indonesia: An Assessment of Bureaucratic and 
Judicial Review Mechanism," Sydney Law Review 32, No. 2 (2010): 177.
8 See, for example, Tim Lindsey, Islam, Law and the State in Southeast Asia (London: I.B Tauris, 2012), 365.
9 Dani Prabowo, "Ini 40 RUU dalam Prolegnas Prioritas 2016," Kompas, January 22, 2016, http://nasional.kompas. 
com/read/2016/01/22/13450911/Ini.40.RUU.dalam.Prolegnas.Prioritas.2016?page=all>; ‘Sepanjang 2016, 22 RUU 
Telah Sah Jadi UU’ Hukumonline (27 December 2016) <http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5862593001f54/ 
sepanjang-2016--22-ruu-telah-sah-jadi-uu.
10 Eddy Damian and Robert Hornick, "Indonesia's Formal Legal System: An Introduction," American Journal of 
Comparative Law 20 (1972): 492.
11 Indonesian Constitutional Court decisions 137/PUU-XIII/2015 and 56/PUU-XIV/2016. See also Kompas. ‘Putusan 
MK Cabut Kewenangan Mendagri Batalkan Perda Provinsi’, Kompas (14 June 2017) http://nasional.kompas.com/
read/2017/06/14/22392261/putusan.mk.cabut.kewenangan.mendagri.batalkan.perda.provinsi
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against inappropriate regulations. The only place this can now be done is the 
Supreme Court, which, as mentioned, is a reluctant reviewer of regulations at 
best and, in any event, can never consider their constitutionality. 
Soeharto’s ‘New Order’ regime promulgated a large number of unconstitutional 
laws and regulations but nothing could be done about that until after his New 
Order regime collapsed in 1998 because there was no means by which a court 
could review the constitutionality of any legislation until the Constitutional Court 
was established in 2003.12  The result was, to use the words of the United States 
Supreme Court with which this paper began, that, under Soeharto, courts could 
only ‘decide cases conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution’. The 
establishment of the Constitutional Court did not, however, fully remedy the 
situation because, again, it cannot do anything about unconstitutional regulations. 
As matters stand, if a future government with a majority in the DPR decided to 
deliberately subvert the Constitutional Court by adopting New Order practice 
and issuing unconstitutional regulations there is nothing that could be done to 
repeal them. As will be shown below, this has, in fact, happened at least once in 
the post-Soeharto era, and that leaves Indonesians vulnerable to the possibility 
of unconstitutional rule.  
In this paper, I argue that it is open to the Constitutional Court to reconsider 
its position on review of regulations in order to fill the hole in Indonesia’s system 
of constitutional law. It could do so by interpreting its power of judicial review 
of statutes to extend to cover laws below the level of statutes. 
More specifically, I will argue, first, that a split jurisdiction for judicial review, 
like that in Indonesia, should not necessarily be seen as a creating two ‘siloed’ 
jurisdictions, one for statutes and one for regulations, such that a constitutional 
court should be excluded from reviewing lower level laws. Second, I will argue 
that the power to review statutes should always extend by implication to 
12 As Soeharto controlled the legislature, which became little more than a ‘rubber-stamp’ for his regime’s legislative 
program, the absence of a court of constitutional review mean there was effectively no means of restraining his 
government from passing unconstitutional laws.  See Todung Mulya Lubis, ‘The Rechsstaat and Human Rights’ 
in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia: Law and Society, 1st edition, Annandale: Federation Press (1999): 171-85; A Nation 
in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Boulder: Westview Press, (1994): 272; and Patrick Ziegenhain, The Indonesian 
Parliament and Democratization, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (2008): 45.
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regulations made under them. To support these arguments, I will refer briefly 
to the experience of constitutional courts outside Indonesia.
Before doing so, however, I offer a brief account of how Indonesia came 
to have a system of judicial constitutional review that is restricted to statutes, 
showing that the current hole in the system may not have been intended - or 
even anticipated - by those who created it.
II. DISCUSSION
2.1. The Development of Constitutional Review in Indonesia
In the course of debate in the BPUPKI13 or Investigating Committee for the 
Preparation of Independence, in the lead-up to independence in 1945, Muhammad 
Yamin proposed that a Supreme Court be established with the power to review 
the constitutionality of laws. 
This proposal was opposed by Professor Soepomo, a supporter of 
authoritarianism who became the lead drafter of the current 1945 Constitution, 
for two reasons. First, Soepomo rightly saw constitutional review as an intrinsic 
part of liberal democracy and the concept of separation of powers, both of which 
were concepts he opposed, arguing instead for an authoritarian ‘Integralistic’ 
state, modelled on Nazi Germany and imperial Japan.14 Second, Soepomo believed 
that, given the lack of lawyers and judges in the nascent republic, a court of 
constitutional review was simply not viable.15 Accordingly, the 1945 Constitution 
he drafted was promulgated on 18 August without provision for judicial review 
of the constitutionality of laws.
A limited form of judicial review was, however, adopted four years later in the 
short-lived Federal Constitution of 1949. Article 130(2) of the Federal Constitution 
made it clear that federal laws could not be reviewed (tidak dapat diganggu 
gugat) but other laws, including laws of the federation’s constituent states, 
13 Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPUPKI.
14 For a brief account of these debates and Soepomo’s views, see Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, The Constitution of 
Indonesia: A Contextual Analysis, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), 9-12.
15 Saafroedin Bahar and Nannie Hudawati.  Risalah Sidang Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia (BPUKI), Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI), 28 Mei 1945-22 Agustus 1945, (Jakarta: 
Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1998), 183-306.
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could be reviewed by the Supreme Court for compliance with the Constitution 
(Arts 156 to 158). However, even this limited form of constitutional review was 
removed by the 1950 Provisional Constitution, which replaced the federal system 
within just a few months. Article 95(2) of this constitution stated bluntly that 
laws cannot be reviewed.
This remained the position from when Soekarno reinstated the 1945 
Constitution in 1959, until some four years after Soeharto came to power in 
1966. Judicial review of laws below the level of statute against statutes was then 
introduced by Law 14 of 1970 on Judicial Powers and Article 26 granted the 
power to do this to the Supreme Court. It remained the case, however, that no 
court could review statutes or, for that matter, the constitutionality of any law, 
until some years after Soeharto fell from power in 1998.
As part of post-Soeharto efforts to rid Indonesia of some of the more 
egregious laws introduced by his New Order, the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat, People’s Consultative Assembly), then the most powerful legislative body 
in Indonesia, granted itself the power to constitutionally review statutes in its 
Decision III of 2000 on the Sources and Hierarchy of Laws. Article 5 of this 
Decree created a split jurisdiction to review laws. The MPR was authorised to 
review the constitutionality of statutes, while the review of laws below the level 
of statute against higher level laws (but, again, not against the Constitution) 
remained in the hands of the Supreme Court.
After the fall of Soeharto, the 1945 constitution was amended four times, 
once annually in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002. The Fourth Amendment of 2002 
retained the Supreme Court but established a Constitutional Court, among 
other things. It also finally conferred the power on the Constitutional Court to 
review statutes. This was a watershed moment in Indonesian legal history but 
the debate about Indonesia’s courts and their powers of review had, in fact, 
been revived some years earlier.
In late 1999, with euphoria over the end of the New Order still in the air, 
several proposals for judicial review of laws were discussed by the MPR Working 
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Group on amendment of the 1945 Constitution.16 The first was to extend the 
Supreme Court’s powers to allow it to review all forms of laws against the 
Constitution - both statutes and regulations. Hendi Tjaswadi (military/police 
faction), Valina Singka Subakti (Golkar or Functional Group faction), and Patrialis 
Akbar (National Mandate faction and later a Constitutional Court judge)17 all 
argued that the Supreme Court should be given this wide power of review.
Dahlan Ranuwihardjo, a member of the Expert Team (Tim Ahli) appointed 
to advise the MPR on this issue, argued that it should be the MPR, not the 
Supreme Court, that reviewed statutes. Ranuwihardjo, adopting classic New 
Order arguments, reasoned that the Supreme Court should be seen as being on 
the same level as the president and the DPR, so should not be able to annul 
the statutes they produce. The MPR, on the other hand, had a higher position 
and was therefore better suited to review law. Ranuwihardjo further argued that 
judicial review of statutes was ‘American’, and not suitable for Indonesia. The 
MPR, he said, was the ‘Indonesian answer’.18 
Ranuwihardjo’s proposal was rejected by the Expert Team. Instead it proposed 
that a new Constitutional Court should be established and authorised to review 
the constitutionality of all laws. Jimly Asshiddiqie, another member of the Expert 
Team and later the founding Chief Justice of that court, argued:
The Supreme Court is authorised to decide cases in relation to justice for 
the citizens, while the Constitutional Court is to guard the laws, to maintain 
law and order, to harmonise the constitution and all other regulations 
below the basic law. Therefore, judicial review should be in one court. All 
the reviews should be conducted by the Constitutional Court. Currently, 
the Supreme Court has the authority to review regulations below statute 
… this authority should be moved the Constitutional Court. This Court is 
the one to maintain the order of laws. Not only below statute, but all laws 
below the constitution.19
16  Sekretariat Jenderal dan Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi, Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan 
Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945: Latar Belakang, Proses dan Hasil Pembahasan 
1999- 2002 (Buku VI Tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman), (Edisi Revisi), Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan 
Mahkamah Konstitusi (2010).
17  Ibid, 43 – 49. Before he could complete his first term, Patrialis Akbar was discharged from the court as a result 
of corruption allegations. In September 2017, he was convicted at first instance by the Jakarta Anti-corruption 
Court and jailed for eight years.
18 Ibid, 81 – 82. All translations are the author’s.
19 Ibid, 507.
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This proposal of the Expert Team was, unfortunately, dismissed by the MPR 
Working Committee, without much explanation.20 Instead, the current split 
jurisdiction for review of laws was created by the Fourth Amendment, which 
introduced Article 24C into the 1945 Constitution. This provides, as mentioned, 
that the Constitutional Court has the power to review the constitutionality of 
statutes, while Article 24A authorised the Supreme Court to review laws below 
the level of statute for compliance with higher level laws (but not for compliance 
with the Constitution).
It seems clear that the resulting situation by which the constitutionality 
of lower level laws cannot be tested in any Indonesian court was not properly 
anticipated during the amendment debates. Not only was it not discussed but 
no one even raised the issue. It seems, in fact, to have been an oversight. This 
is all the more surprising given the issue had certainly arisen in other countries 
well before Indonesia began amending its Constitution in 1999, as I show below.
2.2. Constitutional Courts and Review of Regulations
As a preliminary point, I emphasise that the power to review subordinate 
regulations is not an exclusive feature of common law systems, as Ranuwihardjo 
implied, and as is still sometimes suggested in Indonesia. Certainly, courts of 
common law countries such as the United States, Australia, and Canada do 
routinely constitutionally review regulations, and strike them down when they 
contravene constitutional protections, or otherwise exceed constitutional power. 
That is also true, however, for many constitutional courts in civil law countries, 
for example, Germany, Japan, Taiwan and Korea. 
Likewise, while review of subordinate regulations is standard in jurisdictions 
with an apex court of mixed constitutional and appellate or general jurisdiction,21 
the power to review regulations is also found in some jurisdictions where judicial 
review is divided between two apex courts, as in Indonesia, that is, where a 
specialised constitutional court sits alongside an appellate court or court of 
20 Ibid.
21  In the US context see, for example, the survey of recent US Supreme Court practice in Erica Newland, "Executive 
Orders in Court," Yale Law Journal Vol. 124 (2015): 2026. 
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general jurisdiction. Examples include the constitutional courts of Korea and 
Germany, with the latter commonly seen as the archetype of divided judicial 
review. Constitutional courts in many such jurisdictions have either been granted 
the power to review regulations, as in Germany, or have implied it as inherent 
to the power to review statutes, as in Korea. 
In fact, Korea’s Constitutional Court - a constitutional court in an Asian 
civil law country with a split jurisdiction for judicial review of laws - offers an 
excellent point of comparison in assessing Indonesia’s very similar system of 
judicial review of laws.
2.3. The Constitutional Court of Korea 
The Constitutional Court of Korea, like the Constitutional Court of Indonesia, 
is, as mentioned, a specialised constitutional court that sits alongside a Supreme 
Court. The Korean Supreme Court was explicitly assigned the power to adjudicate 
the constitutionality of administrative regulations, while the Korean Constitutional 
Court was not. 
Specifically, Article 107 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea splits 
the jurisdictions of the Courts as follows: 
(1) When the constitutionality of a law is at issue in a trial the courts shall 
request a decision of the Constitutional Court, and shall judge according 
to the decision thereof.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have the power to make a final review of 
the constitutionality or legality of administrative decrees, regulations 
or actions, when their constitutionality or legality is at issue in a 
trial.  [Emphasis added]
In other words, the power conferred on the Korean Constitutional Court is 
to review laws or statutes, while the Supreme Court has the power to review 
laws below that level, that is, administrative decrees, regulations or actions. 
Despite these seemingly clear provisions, the Korean Constitutional Court 
has been able to expand its powers to constitutionally invalidate subordinate 
regulations. It has done this in two ways.  
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First, it has restrictively interpreted the primary legislation such that it 
constitutionally invalidates sub-regulations. In other words, it has held that when 
provisions in a statute are struck down, administrative regulations made under 
those provisions will now longer have any legal basis and so must necessarily 
also be void. As well as having compelling legal logic, this position reflects 
the fact that, as a matter of practicality, many subordinate regulations lose all 
coherence once terms, definitions, procedures or institutions in the statute they 
are intended to apply fall away.22   
2.4. The Scriveners’ Case: Implied Jurisdiction  
Second, and more significantly for the Indonesian case, the Korean 
Constitutional Court has asserted an implied jurisdiction over administrative 
regulations, with the implication arising from its clear power to review statutes. 
In a landmark decision in the Rules Implementing the Certified Judicial 
Scriveners Act Case23 of 1990, the Court held that it had an implied jurisdiction 
to constitutionally review rules and regulations, at least where rules and 
regulations directly infringe people's basic rights in principle, and irrespective of 
actual implementation or enforcement. The Court describes this as the “direct 
infringement by law” requirement: 
The requirement of “direct infringement by law” means that the complainant’s 
rights and freedoms are directly infringed by the law itself of which he/she 
complains, not by any specific executive action taken to implement it. [Even 
if] a law is expected to be implemented by further administrative action, 
if the law by itself has directly changed people’s legal rights and duties or 
already determined people’s legal status before any specific act has taken 
place to implement it, thereby irrefutably concluding people’s legal rights 
and duties to the extent that such rights and duties cannot be changed by 
22 As Ginsburg observes, discussing the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Korea, ‘The question of the 
constitutionality of an administrative regulation frequently requires interpretation of the relevant statutory text. 
[For example, a] restrictive interpretation of a statute will tend to void on constitutional grounds any adminis-
trative action taken under it, where those actions rely on a broad reading on the statute’. Tom Ginsburg, ‘The 
Constitutional Court and the Judicialization of Korean Politics’ in Andrew Harding and Pip Nicholson (eds), New 
Courts in Asia, Abingdon, Routledge (2009): 153.
23 South Korean Constitutional Court: Rules Implementing the Certified Judicial Scriveners Act Case (1990) 89 Hun-
Ma 178. Judicial scriveners are a kind of legal professional found in Japan and South Korea, who assist clients in 
commercial and real estate registrations and in preparing documents for litigation.
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any further administrative action, the requirement of directness is regarded 
to be fulfilled.24  
This aspect of the Court’s reasoning to justify an implied jurisdiction to review 
subordinate regulation rests on several bases. Most importantly, it considered 
that Article 107(2) of the Constitution, properly read, did not exclusively assign 
the constitutional review of all administrative action (including regulations) to 
the Supreme Court but only that “at issue in a trial”. Because only implemented 
or enforced regulations could be put at issue in trial, the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional review jurisdiction was not available for persons whose rights 
had been directly infringed – that is, infringed by the fact of regulation, rather 
than its implementation or, in other words, infringed in principle. That such 
persons merited constitutional review and relief was made plain, the Court 
held, by provision for individual constitutional complaints alleging violations 
of basic rights. 
The Court therefore concluded that constitutional review of administrative 
action other than action “at issue in trial” must be within the jurisdiction of 
the Constitutional Court. Were Article 107(2) read otherwise, there would be 
a jurisdictional vacuum, in that there would be no possibility of constitutional 
review or remedies for individuals whose rights were directly infringed by a 
subordinate regulation. 
This is, of course, precisely the problem that has arisen in Indonesia, where 
the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to determine constitutional rights (but 
not to review regulations), while the Supreme Court deals with appeals from 
trials (and has not power of constitutional review), so there is no possibility 
of constitutional review or remedies for individuals whose rights are directly 
infringed by subordinate regulation.25 
24 South Korean Constitutional Court: Prior Review of Broadcast Advertisements Case (2008) 2005 Hun-Ma 506. 
25 Further, and less relevant to the Indonesian situation, the Korean Constitutional Court interpreted its jurisdictional 
statute, the Constitutional Court Act, which renders “governmental power” subject to its constitutional adjudica-
tion, as necessarily referring to all governmental powers including legislative, judicial and administrative powers.
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2.5. Responses to the Scriveners’ Case  
As would undoubtedly be the case if a similar decision was made by the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court, the Scriveners’ Case decision proved immediately 
controversial in Korea. The Korean court’s reading of Article 107(2) received a 
mixed academic response and there was even some discussion of impeaching 
Justice Byun, who issued the Court’s judgment.26 Unsurprisingly, the Korean 
Supreme Court vigorously objected to what it saw as a usurpation of its jurisdiction, 
issuing a “statement ... condemning the Constitutional Court decision, and saying 
that it had ‘gone beyond its domain.”27 
However, this controversy quickly abated and the judgment in the Scriveners’ 
Case was complied with. The Supreme Court, despite its protests, did ultimately 
conduct the judicial scriveners’ licensing examination as the Constitutional 
Court had found it should.28  What is more, the Constitutional Court has since 
continued to assert jurisdiction over rules and regulations with little of the 
pushback seen in the immediate aftermath of the Scriveners’ Case. It now appears 
well-settled in the jurisprudence of the Korean Constitutional Court that it can 
exercise jurisdiction over subordinate regulations where the “direct infringement 
of law” requirement is met, that is, where a regulation in principle infringes the 
Constitution, regardless of whether it has been implemented. 
For example, in the Billiard Hall Entry Restriction case,29  the Korean 
Constitutional Court struck down subordinate regulations issued under the 
Installation and Utilization of Sports Facilities Act that required billiard halls 
to post signs prohibiting the entry of minors. The Court held that the rules 
were beyond the scope of the primary statute, violated the Constitutional 
right of equality by discriminating against billiard hall operators, and, by 
barring a significant proportion of billiard hall clientele from entry, violated 
26 Constitutional Court of Korea, The First Ten Years of the Korean Constitutional Court, Constitutional Court of Korea, 
Seoul: Republic of Korea (2001). 
27 Tom Ginsburg, "The Constitutional Court and the Judicialization of Korean Politics," in New Courts in Asia, ed. 
Andrew Harding (New York: Routledge, 2009), 154.
28 Constitutional Court of Korea, The First Ten Years of the Korean Constitutional Court: 53. 
29  (1993) 92 Hun-Ma 80; Ibid: 202. 
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the constitutional right to freedom of occupation. The Ministry of Culture and 
Sports complied by amending the rules, and eliminated the signage requirement. 
More recently, in the Prior Review of Broadcast Advertisements Case,30 the 
Court struck down an enforcement decree and a regulation under the Broadcasting 
Act that prohibited a broadcaster from broadcasting an advertisement without 
prior review by a review board on the basis that the prior review amounted to 
constitutionally prohibited censorship.  
III. CONCLUSION
There are four conclusions to draw from the experience of the Korean 
Constitutional Court that are relevant to Indonesia’s system of constitutional 
review. First, while the constitutional  review of subordinate regulations is well 
within the jurisdiction of apex courts with mixed jurisdiction constitutional and 
appellate jurisdictions, such as Australia, the United States, Canada and, in Asia, 
Japan, it also not uncommon among specialist constitutional courts.  This is true 
even in systems, including civil law systems, where judicial review is divided 
between constitutional and generalist courts, as in Germany, Taiwan and Korea. 
In fact, the Constitutional Court of Indonesia’s failure to review subordinate 
regulations puts it out of step with some of the most effective constitutional 
courts in the region, such as those in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.
Second, the Korean Constitutional Court’s view that the power to review 
a law must necessarily include subordinate regulations issued under that law 
is a logical and persuasive one. It also has the virtue of preventing a situation 
arising where a government can pre-empt the consequences of a statute being 
struck down by simply passing a similar regulation, thus defeating the whole 
purpose of constitutional review.
In fact, as indicated earlier, something like this has happened before in 
Indonesia.31 In 2005, the Constitutional Court struck down the Law 20 of 2002 
30  (2008) 2005 Hun-Ma 506. 
31  As is discussed in more detail in Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, "Economic reform when the Constitution matters: 
Indonesia’s Constitutional Court and Article 33", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol 44, No. 2, (2008): 
239-261.
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on Electricity32 and the Yudhoyono government responded by issuing a regulation 
two months later that was ‘not much different’33 to the Law and was, in fact, 
described at the time as a re-enactment of it ‘in new clothes’.34  Likewise, when 
the Court began hearings began in relation to Law 7 of 2004 on Water Resources, 
the government, apparently concerned that the court might strike it down, issued 
a Government Regulation that had a very similar effect to a significant part of the 
Law.35 In the end, the court did not invalidate provisions of the Water Resources 
Law in its decision but the government seems to have issued the regulation as 
form of ‘regulatory insurance’. If this tactic was used more often by governments 
to exploit the absence in Indonesia of judicial review of the constitutionality of 
regulations, it could, as suggested earlier, render the judicial review of statutes 
futile, and thus render the Constitution if not meaningless, at least of greatly 
diminished importance.
Third, the example of Korea effectively demonstrates that apparent 
constitutional barriers to the constitutional review of regulations by the 
Constitutional Court may be overcome through a principled but pragmatic 
approach to the interpretation of jurisdictional divisions in the Constitution. 
While there are differences between the relevant Korean and Indonesian 
jurisdictional provisions, the broad outlines of the interpretative approach adopted 
by the Constitutional Court of Korea may be transferable: a constitutionally 
split jurisdiction need not be read as creating two exclusive jurisdictions – it 
could, rather, be seen as dual, bifurcated system, where both courts can review 
regulations, one against higher level laws and the other against the Constitution. 
Instead, the current narrow reading of the jurisdictional split in Indonesia 
has, as mentioned, created a jurisdictional vacuum that, in important cases, 
limits the availability to citizens of constitutional review, and thus, constitutional 
rights. It is open to Indonesia’s Constitutional Court to follow the example of 
32  Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003.
33  Fultoni, Secretary of the National Legal Reform Consortium (Konsorsium Reformasi Hukum Nasional) cited in Butt 
and Lindsey, "Economic reform when the Constitution matters: Indonesia’s Constitutional Court and Article 33": 259.
34  Hotma Timpul, a Jakarta Lawyer, cited in Ibid: 259.
35  Government Regulation 16 of 2005 on the Development of a Drinking Water Availability System. See also Indo-
nesian Constitutional Court Decisions 058-059-060-063/PUU-II/2004 and 008/PUU-III/2005.
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Korea’s court and fill that hole, by implying a right to constitutionally review 
regulations, thus providing a remedy for individuals whose constitutional rights 
are infringed by subordinate regulation. Then, at last, Indonesian courts might be 
able to ‘determine cases’ involving regulations ‘conformably to the Constitution’ 
and not be obliged to follow regulations even if they are ‘in opposition to the 
Constitution’, as is currently the case. 
Fourth, the example of Korea indicates that although implying a right to 
review subordinate regulation as inherent in the power to review statutes can 
be expected to be immediately controversial it may be politically viable in the 
longer term. In Korea, initial sharp criticisms were not sustained. The Korean 
case suggests that it is reasonable to expect that the consistent and principled 
assertion by a Constitutional Court of a broader review jurisdiction that extends 
to regulations may eventually be complied with, and coalesce into accepted 
jurisdictional reality. 
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